

*J. R. ...*

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION, W. AVERELL HARRIMAN and PAUL C. WARNKE, 11:45 am, 19 September 1978, Department of State, Washington, D.C.

I told Paul I was lunching with Bob Strauss and he would be seeing the President, so I wanted to know two things:

One, how serious Mark Childs' account was of the White House influence (*Pafshoon's*) in not going ahead with SALT. Paul said it was serious and that there was a group who knew nothing of foreign policy who were advising it but that so far the President had resisted it. *I* of *the world.* course, expressed my conviction that the surest way to get beaten is to have a "do-nothing" President, but I was hopeful, on the basis of his success with the initiative in the Middle East, this would encourage the continuation of *his* a vigorous attitude on SALT and non-proliferation.

My other question was that I had heard that Harold Brown was getting more sticky. He said, "Yes, particularly on any limitations on the use of Cruise." He said he thought we could get the 20 percent for maneuvering in addition to the 2500 kms., but not any more. He thought the President would have to make up his mind on this point and on several other points such as the duration of the Protocol.

*↓ Brown would support him.*

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Backfire was really a non-issue and yet did require skillful handling. By and large, Paul was hopeful that the President's success in the Middle East would encourage him to vigorous action. It was too bad that Cy's trip to the Middle East postponed the meeting with Gromyko. The SALT negotiations hung on that meeting, to be followed by <sup>H</sup> a meeting of Gromyko <sup>Cy</sup> with the President.

H Then